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 Abstract
The recognition of emotional facial expressions is often subject to contextual influence, particularly 
when the face and the context convey similar emotions. We investigated whether spontaneous, 
incidental affective theory of mind inferences made while reading vignettes describing social 
situations would produce context effects on the identification of same-valenced emotions 
(Experiment 1) as well as differently-valenced emotions (Experiment 2) conveyed by subsequently 
presented faces. Crucially, we found an effect of context on reaction times in both experiments 
while, in line with previous work, we found evidence for a context effect on accuracy only in 
Experiment 1. This demonstrates that affective theory of mind inferences made at the pragmatic 
level of a text can automatically, contextually influence the perceptual processing of emotional 
facial expressions in a separate task even when those emotions are of a distinctive valence. Thus, 
our novel findings suggest that language acts as a contextual influence to the recognition of 
emotional facial expressions for both same and different valences.
Key words: theory of mind; inference; emotion; context; face processing
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Affective theory of mind inferences contextually influence the recognition of emotional facial
expressions
Much of our everyday social interaction relies on our ability to understand the mental states 
of others, which is known as “theory of mind” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Theory of mind 
involves representation of knowledge, beliefs, and intentions (cognitive theory of mind) as well as 
emotions [affective theory of mind (aToM); e.g., Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher, & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2005]. Specifically, aToM inferences often rely on the contextual, communicative 
value of observed emotional facial expressions (e.g., the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test,” 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). What is less clear, however, is the reverse
– whether contextual aToM inferences can influence the subsequent identification of emotional 
facial expressions. We investigated this question by looking for evidence of this influence in 
measures of processing speed and accuracy when participants identified facial emotions after 
reading vignettes that implied an emotion that either was congruent or incongruent with the 
subsequent facial emotion.
Previous work has established that people generally do consider the surrounding context 
when identifying facial emotions (Aviezer et al., 2008; Aviezer, Trope, & Todorov, 2012; Barrett &
Kensinger, 2010; Kayyal, Widen, & Russell, 2015; Righart & de Gelder, 2008; Schwarz, Wieser, 
Gerdes, Mühlberger, & Pauli, 2013; cf. Nakamura, Buck, & Kenny, 1990). “Context” pertains to 
anything separate from the facial emotion itself (Hassin, Aviezer, & Bentin, 2013; Wieser & 
Brosch, 2012) and includes (but is not limited to) pictorial scenes, body position and body language,
individual emotional words, vignettes, and even the neurological processes occurring in parallel 
within the perceiver (Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007). 
However, there is good theoretical reason to believe that the degree of contextual influence 
on the identification of emotional facial expressions varies according to specific conditions. One 
such theoretical example is that of “limited situational dominance” (Carroll & Russell, 1996). In 
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this account, Carroll and Russell assert that observers rely on three dimensions of facial expressions
in order to accurately classify the emotions they convey, and these are quasi-physical information, 
pleasantness, and arousal. Quasi-physical information pertains to the physical aspects of an 
expression that characterise that expression but which are not unique to it (Carroll and Russell give 
the example of a smile which can be recognised as such but does not determine whether the 
expression is of joy, embarrassment, nervousness, or a polite greeting). According to their view, 
pleasantness pertains to the positive or negative valence of the facial emotion, and arousal to its 
intensity. Carroll and Russell argue that when emotions portrayed by a face and by a situation are 
incongruent on all three dimensions (e.g., happiness and sadness), then the emotion in the face will 
take precedence, meaning that context has little to no influence. However, when the facial and 
situational emotional information are congruent on these aspects (e.g., fear and anger: aroused, 
unhappy, staring quasi-physical features; negative valence; high arousal), then the emotion 
portrayed by the situation will take precedence, meaning that the context has a strong influence and 
the facial emotion may, therefore, be mis-classified. Carroll and Russell found evidence for this 
theory in a series of experiments in which participants listened to the researcher read emotionally 
charged vignettes and then viewed photographs of differing emotional faces which were typically 
still congruent for quasi-physical information, pleasantness, and arousal (e.g., fear and anger). 
Participants chose what emotion (from several choices) the face was expressing, and their responses
tended to be congruent with the vignette’s emotion rather than the intended emotion of the face. 
Thus, Carroll and Russell’s findings suggest that people extract affective information from 
narratives which seems to incidentally influence how emotional information in a subsequently 
presented face is interpreted, particularly when the emotions are relatively similar. However, it is 
impossible to directly attribute this effect to the written content of the vignettes because hearing the 
vignettes read aloud is a contextual influence in itself – the researcher could have unwittingly 
emphasised the emotion consistent with the vignette through prosodic factors and his/her own facial
expressions and body language (Wieser & Brosch, 2012). Nonetheless, similar effects have been 
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uncovered with neuroimaging (Kim et al., 2004) and for ambiguous versus unambiguous facial 
emotions (Trope, 1986). Thus, the work presented here tested the theory of limited situational 
dominance in a new way through tightly controlled experiments that allowed participants to read the
vignettes themselves rather than listening to them, that used a larger number of items, and that 
measured the effect on both processing and a subsequent classification task. Furthermore, as will be
described, our vignettes were designed such that any context effect observed came from the 
implicit, spontaneous, incidental aToM inferences that participants made during narrative 
comprehension; and these were not confounded by the behaviour of the researcher or by explicit 
emotion words in the vignettes.
A contrasting theoretical view comes from Barrett and colleagues (Barrett & Kensinger, 
2010; Barrett et al., 2007; Gendron, Lindquist, Barsalou, & Barrett, 2012; Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-
Moreau, & Russell, 2006), who developed a “language-as-context” hypothesis. Their evidence 
suggests that when people encounter individual emotional words, the comprehension of these words
activates conceptual knowledge and sensory-related information in memory and that these 
simulations then act as top-down influences on the perception of simultaneously or subsequently 
presented facial stimuli (Gendron et al., 2012). Thus, these researchers suggest that the emotion 
word response options in many experiments contextually influence the perception of facial stimuli. 
In the work presented below, we were interested in linguistic contextual influences to the 
interpretation of facial emotions beyond the lexical level and, therefore, tested an extended version 
of the language-as-context hypothesis. We investigated whether spontaneous aToM inferences 
made at the pragmatic level about someone else’s inner experiences could incidentally 
influence the perception of emotional facial expressions in an unrelated task. Thus, we tested 
predictions generated by the limited situational dominance account (broadly, that aToM inferences 
will only be influential in the conditions where these inferences are similar to the facial emotion to 
be identified, e.g., fear / anger but not happiness / sadness ) versus an extension of the language-as-
context account (broadly, that aToM inferences will be influential regardless of the similarity of the 
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inferences to the emotion in the face, e.g., fear / anger as well as happiness / sadness). We focused 
on the pragmatic level of narrative comprehension as psycholinguistic research suggests that people
spontaneously make mental and emotional state inferences during reading, although the specificity 
of these inferences is debatable (Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992; Gygax, Oakhill, & 
Garnham, 2003; Haigh & Bonnefon, 2015). Furthermore, this focus is similar to work involving the
picture verification task used by Zwaan and colleagues (e.g., Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002) 
which demonstrates that people mentally activate specific perceptual details of an object which are 
only implied by a preceding text. 
Across two experiments, we investigated context effects of aToM inferences on the 
identification of facial emotions and determined whether the limited situational dominance account 
or the extended language-as-context account was better able to explain the findings. In Experiment 
1, we explored what happens with emotions that are similar in terms of valence and arousal by 
examining congruent and incongruent combinations of situations and faces depicting fear and 
anger. Participants read vignettes that invited a “fear” or “anger” inference about the mental state of
a character before being asked to identify the emotion of a subsequently presented face which 
portrayed either fear or anger. Combinations of fear and anger were also tested by Carroll and 
Russell (1996) because the affective signals for fear and anger are congruent for quasi-physical 
features (aroused, staring, unhappy expression), pleasantness, and arousal yet are discrepant for 
specific emotions. According to Carroll and Russell’s theory of limited situational dominance, the 
situational emotion should dominate and so we expected that reaction times (RTs) recorded during 
the face classification task would be slower and that responses would be less accurate when the 
emotions of the situation and the face were incongruent compared to when they were congruent. 
The extended version of Barrett and colleagues’ language-as-context hypothesis would suggest that 
aToM inferences made at the pragmatic level of the text unlock related sensory information and 
information from memory, producing a context effect on the identification of subsequent emotional 
faces. This account also makes a prediction that RTs will be slower and responses less accurate 
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when the emotions of the vignette and the face are incongruent. Thus, Experiment 1 tested whether 
the methodology is a valid, reliable, and sensitive way of detecting the expected context effects. 
Subsequently, Experiment 2 pitched the two theoretical models against each other by testing their 
differing predictions (described later) for congruent and incongruent combinations of differently-
valenced emotions (happiness / sadness).
Experiment 1
Method
For both experiments, we report how our sample size was determined and all data 
exclusions, manipulations, and measures.
Participants
A power analysis indicated that 32 participants would be sufficient to find a medium effect 
size at approximately 80% power (Lenth, 2006-9). Thus, 32 participants aged between 18 and 65 
were opportunity sampled from students and staff at the University of Chester (25 female; mean age
= 25.50 years, SD = 9.65 years). A further two participants were tested but their data discarded due 
to one performing below chance for facial emotion recognition accuracy and one being 
inadvertently run on the wrong experimental list. All participants confirmed no serious visual 
impairments, no reading difficulties such as dyslexia, and a first language of English. Participants 
were eligible for a prize draw of one of ten £10 Amazon.co.uk vouchers and were awarded 
participation credits where suitable. The study was approved by the University of Chester 
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee.
Materials
Vignettes (see Anger example) were composed which described social situations in which 
emotional reactions might be expected.1 They comprised four sentences, and all vignettes involved 
social situations with a named main character interacting with or being affected by at least one other
person (never named). Explicit descriptions of emotions or specific emotional words were avoided 
1 See online supplemental material for detailed descriptions of the vignette development for both experiments.
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(Barrett et al., 2007; Wieser & Brosch, 2012); therefore, the emotion felt by the character had to be 
inferred. There was no instruction to make such an inference, and making an inference was not vital
for comprehension of the vignette so any such inferences were spontaneous and elaborative. 
Anger example:
Lucy worked part-time for a local newspaper and had been working on a 
big story about a campaign to save the historic town hall. She had even 
worked overtime and had spent her own money to interview lots of 
residents and do all the research. Her editor praised Lucy for all her hard 
work and told her it would be on the front page. When Lucy bought the 
paper the next day, she saw her editor had put his own name on the 
report.
Thirty-two angry and fearful vignettes were used in the experimental items (henceforth, 
“item” refers to the pairing of vignettes and faces). Thirty-two additional vignettes equally split 
across sadness, happiness, surprise, and disgust were used in the filler items. Vignettes within every
emotion category were balanced for the main character’s gender. Both experiments’ vignettes are 
available online as supplemental material.
Colour photographs of faces were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces 
database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 1998). Hit rates from Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, and 
Verschuere’s (2008) study indicating good recognition were used to select 16 angry and 16 fearful 
faces. The hit rates for the angry (74.10%, SD = 11.03%) and fearful (73.13%, SD = 6.56%) faces 
did not differ, t (30) = 0.30, p = .765. However, the angry faces had a lower mean arousal rating 
than the fearful faces, 3.25 (SD = 0.26) versus 3.82 (SD = 0.39); t (30) = 4.90, p < .001. To examine
the impact of this difference in arousal, we ran the main RT analysis with and without arousal as a 
co-variate. The models were not statistically different, χ2 (2) = 2.113, p = .348, meaning that the 
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difference in arousal levels of the angry versus fearful faces did not impact the tested effect (and the
key interaction between Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion remains significant when the covariate
of arousal is added). Thus, the analysis in which arousal was free to vary is presented below. Thirty-
two additional filler faces expressing happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise were selected using 
high recognition hit rates. Faces representing each emotion were balanced for gender. 
Design and procedure
All 32 experimental items were counterbalanced along a 2 (vignette: angry vs. fearful) x 2 
(face: angry vs. fearful) design. Thus, two lists were created such that experimental vignettes paired 
with congruent faces in the first list were paired with incongruent faces in the second; equal 
numbers of participants viewed each list. Each list also contained 32 filler items that were a mix of 
congruent and incongruent combinations of vignettes and faces representing happiness, sadness, 
disgust, and surprise. The main character’s gender was matched with the gender of the subsequently
presented face.
The experiment was run in E-Prime 2 (Version 2.0.10.353; Psychology Software Tools, 
2012). Participants sat comfortably at a desktop computer with a standard keyboard with their 
forefingers resting on the “A” and “L” keys. The first screen presented detailed instructions, while 
the second screen presented the key instructions in a numbered list, which emphasised that 
participants should identify the emotional expression of the face as quickly and accurately as 
possible. This was followed by a practice block of three trials and then the experimental block of 64
trials. For each trial, participants first saw a central fixation cross and pressed the spacebar to 
advance when ready. This was followed by the vignette presented in Arial size 12 font. After 
reading it at their own pace, participants pressed the spacebar to advance to the next screen, which 
immediately presented a centrally-located face at width = 50% and height = 60%. The face was 
flanked by two possible response options (e.g., Angry / Fearful) to the lower left and lower right in 
Arial size 18. Participants pressed either the  “A” or “L” key as quickly as possible to make their 
response (correct answers were counterbalanced across left and right, so that response side was 
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balanced across emotion, gender, and congruency). The next screen immediately presented a 
comprehension question (Arial size 18) about a factual aspect of the vignette, which was flanked to 
the lower left by “yes” and to the lower right by “no,” both displayed in Arial size 18. Again, 
participants pressed either the “A” or “L” key to respond. Half the questions should have been 
answered “yes” and half “no”; these were counterbalanced across facial emotion, gender, and 
congruency. A response caused the next trial to begin. Comprehension questions were used on 
every trial to encourage deeper processing of the text (e.g., Stewart, Holler, & Kidd, 2007). No 
feedback was given. A final block of five trials involving happy vignettes and faces was presented. 
These trials, which were not analysed, were presented so that participants would leave the lab in a 
positive frame of mind, which was a requirement of the ethics committee. Accuracy of responses to 
the faces and comprehension questions was recorded along with RTs in milliseconds from the onset
of the face.
Analysis
To analyse the effect of Vignette Emotion and Facial Emotion on RTs we used linear mixed-
effects models (LMMs; Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008) using the lme4 package (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in R (R Development Core Team, 2017). For the accuracy data 
we used the glmer function under the binomial distribution. There are several advantages of the 
(G)LMM approach over factorial ANOVA, which is the statistical technique most frequently paired
with 2x2 experimental designs. Two key advantages of (G)LMMs for 2x2 experimental designs are 
that (1) they are able to account for multiple random effects simultaneously (see Clark, 1973, for a 
discussion highlighting the importance of considering random effects related to items), allowing 
more of the error to be modelled, and (2) all the individual trials can be entered into the analysis 
rather than means for each participant, which gives more statistical power because (G)LMMs are, 
therefore, able to handle the interdependence of repeated observations (Baayen et al., 2008). The 
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code and data for our (G)LMM analyses can be found at https://osf.io/tne5b/. More details about the
parameter estimates of the (G)LMMs are given below.
Results and discussion
The participants had a mean accuracy of 95.81% (SD = 5.12%) for the comprehension 
questions and a mean accuracy of 92.56% (SD = 7.21%) for facial emotion recognition. Data for 
115 trials (11.23%) were excluded from the RT analysis for inaccuracy on either facial emotion 
recognition or comprehension question responses. RTs for a further 25 trials (2.75%) were slower 
than the mean plus three standard deviations for their pertinent conditions. These were replaced 
with the equivalent of the mean plus three standard deviations for the relevant conditions. 
In our LMM analysis for the RT data, the fixed effects were Vignette Emotion (Fear, 
Anger), Facial Emotion (Fear, Anger), and the interaction between these factors. We used deviation 
coding for each of the experimental factors. Our model contained crossed random effects for 
participants, vignettes, and faces. The model with the most maximal effects structure that converged
included random intercepts and additive slopes for both fixed factors by participants, and by 
vignettes, and random intercepts and slopes for the Facial Emotion factor by faces. Restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation was used when reporting the LMM parameters (see Table 1 for 
parameter estimates). The model revealed an interaction between Vignette Emotion and Facial 
Emotion that was significant at <.001 alpha level (estimated by approximating to the z-distribution).
(Table 1 about here)
The interaction was explored with pairwise comparisons performed using the emmeans 
package in R (Lenth, Love & Hervé, 2018) with degrees of freedom approximated using the 
Kenward-Roger method. The pairwise comparisons were interpreted using a Bonferroni-corrected 
alpha level of .025. Figure 1 contains the marginal means and standard errors calculated using the 
emmeans package. They show that RTs were slower for identifying a facial emotion when it 
mismatched the vignette emotion. Angry faces were recognised faster after angry vignettes than 
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after fearful vignettes, t (23.77) = 3.439, p = .002, while fearful faces were recognised faster after 
fearful vignettes than after angry vignettes, t (27.41) = 4.611 p < .001.2 
(Figure 1 about here) 
In our GLMM analysis for the accuracy data, the fixed effects were Vignette Emotion (Fear,
Anger), Facial Emotion (Fear, Anger), and the interaction between these factors. Our model 
contained crossed random effects of participants and vignettes. The random effect of faces was 
dropped in order to arrive at a model that converged. The model with the most maximal effects 
structure that converged included only random intercepts by participants and by vignettes (see 
Table 2 for parameter estimates). The model revealed an interaction between Vignette Emotion and 
Facial Emotion that was significant at < .001 alpha level (based on the z-distribution).
(Table 2 about here)
The interaction was explored with contrasts performed using the emmeans package in R on 
the log odds ratio scale. The pairwise comparisons were interpreted using a Bonferroni-corrected 
alpha level of .025. Figure 2 contains the estimated marginal means and standard errors calculated 
using the emmeans package. They show that accuracy decreased when identifying facial emotions 
that mismatched the preceding vignette emotions. Angry faces were responded to with higher 
accuracy after angry vignettes than after fearful vignettes, z = 4.393, p < .001, while fearful faces 
were responded to with higher accuracy after fearful vignettes than after angry vignettes, z = 
2.575, p = .01. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
The findings of Experiment 1 demonstrate that after spontaneously making aToM inferences
about vignette characters, participants were slower to judge facial emotions that mismatched those 
inferences and were also more likely to make errors compared to when facial emotions and aToM 
2 The same pattern of results is found with a 2x2 ANOVA.
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inferences matched. These results suggest that people represent more than the simple valence of a 
situation (e.g., positive / negative). Instead, they actively make richer, more specific aToM 
inferences about the characters, and this substantially impacts the processing and identification of a 
subsequent facial expression. These results support Carroll and Russell’s (1996) theory of “limited 
situational dominance” as well as the extended language-as-context hypothesis of Barrett and 
colleagues. The findings establish that this methodology is sensitive to providing insight into the 
processing and judgements associated with aToM context effects. 
Thus, Experiment 1 demonstrated that both theoretical models can explain the evidence that 
aToM inferences act as a strong contextual influence upon same-valenced yet discrepant emotions, 
which is also shown by much empirical work. This evidence supports the assertion that context 
assumes a more important role in discriminating between emotions when valence proves less useful.
However, it is possible that context still remains an influential force even when valence is 
distinctive, as has been demonstrated by work on incongruent non-linguistic contexts (e.g., Aviezer 
et al., 2012; but see Hassin et al., 2013). Although this has not yet been conclusively established, it 
is possible that such an effect exists for linguistic contexts as well but has not been detected because
of the tendency for research in the area to examine accuracy responses only rather than processing 
(e.g., Carroll & Russell, 1996, Kayyal et al., 2015; Schwarz et al., 2013). Thus, it is possible that 
this effect is evident during processing, but the information about distinctive valence may then 
override the cost to processing so that a correct accuracy response is made, which would explain 
results frequently found for linguistic contexts. Therefore, the crucial evidence for a context effect 
on processing would come from a difference in RTs between congruent and incongruent conditions.
Additionally, a replication of findings from previous empirical work on linguistic contexts (e.g., 
Carroll & Russell, 1996, Schwarz et al., 2013) would demonstrate no difference in accuracy 
responses accompanying the critical context effect for RTs. Evidence of a context effect on RTs 
would strongly support the extended language-as-context hypothesis, which suggests that 
contextual emotional information has an influence regardless of the degree of similarity between the
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contextual and target emotions. Subsequently determining whether there is an effect on accuracy 
would provide evidence of the strength of this effect in terms of whether valence information is able
to override the contextual processing effect to produce correct accuracy responses (e.g., shown by 
no effect on accuracy) or not (e.g., shown by an effect on accuracy). In contrast, because the theory 
of limited situational dominance describes that emotions of positive versus negative valence may 
also be distinct on quasi-physical information and arousal (e.g., happiness / sadness), then according
to this account, there should be no evidence of a context effect in the crucial analysis of the 
processing (RT) data. This would subsequently be accompanied by no evidence of an effect in the 
accuracy data. Thus, Experiment 2 set out to replicate Experiment 1 using happiness and sadness in 
order to investigate the extent of the influence of contextual aToM inferences and to determine 
whether the theory of limited situational dominance or the extended language-as-context hypothesis
better accounted for the findings overall.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Thirty-two new individuals, selected in the same way as for Experiment 1, participated (20 
female, 11 male, 1 undisclosed gender; mean age = 28.83 years, SD = 11.85 years). Data for two 
additional participants were excluded because they performed at or below chance on accuracy for 
the comprehension questions or facial recognition.
Materials
Thirty-two happy and sad vignettes were used in the experimental materials.3 Thirty-two 
additional vignettes equally split across disgust, fear, anger, and surprise were used in the filler 
items.
3 See the online supplemental material for a description of the vignettes’ development.
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Photographs of 16 happy and 16 sad faces, balanced for gender, were selected in the same 
way as for Experiment 1. The happy faces had a higher mean recognition rate than the sad faces, 
99.61% (SD = 0.70%) versus 94.92% (SD = 2.71%); t (16.99) = 6.71, p < .001, but this is 
unsurprising given the recognition advantage ascribed to happy faces (e.g., Leppänen & Hietanen, 
2004). Importantly, this bias was controlled for by the nature of the experimental effect we 
investigated (i.e., an interaction between the vignette’s intended emotion and the intended facial 
emotion). As expected, the happy and sad faces differed on arousal, with the happy faces having a 
higher mean arousal rating than the sad faces, 4.03 (SD = 0.37) versus 3.38 (SD = 0.36); t (30) = 
5.01, p < .001. An additional 32 faces spread equally across anger, fear, disgust, and surprise and 
balanced for gender were selected for the filler items. 
Design, procedure, and analysis
The design, procedure, and analysis were the same as in Experiment 1. In addition, we 
calculated the Bayes Factor for both the RT and accuracy measures to determine whether the data 
were more supportive of Model 1 (which predicts a congruency effect for the RT and accuracy data)
or Model 2 (which predicts no congruency effect for the RT and accuracy data). This was done 
following the procedure based on the BIC values for the two possible models (Raftery, 1995; 
Wagenmakers, 2007). With respect to the theoretical models, the extended language-as-context 
account would be supported by evidence for Model 1 for the RTs (regardless of whether Model 1 or
Model 2 is supported for accuracy), while the limited situational dominance account would be 
supported by evidence for Model 2 for the RTs (and subsequently by evidence for Model 2 for 
accuracy).
Results and discussion
For the comprehension questions, participants had a mean accuracy of 93.44% (SD = 
5.47%); and for the facial emotion recognition, participants had a mean accuracy of 97.25% (SD = 
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4.36%). Data for 91 trials (8.89%) were excluded from the RT analysis because of inaccuracy on 
the comprehension questions or for facial recognition. Overall, RTs for 16 trials (1.71%) were 
slower than the mean plus three standard deviations for their pertinent conditions; these were 
replaced with the equivalent of the mean plus three standard deviations for the relevant conditions. 
A LMM was fitted to the RT data, following the same procedure used in Experiment 1. The 
fixed effects were Vignette Emotion (Happy, Sad), Facial Emotion (Happy, Sad), and the 
interaction between these factors. We used deviation coding for each of the experimental factors. 
Our model contained crossed random effects for participants, vignettes, and faces. The model with 
the most maximal effects structure that converged included random intercepts and slopes for both 
fixed effects and the interaction between them by participants, and by vignettes, and random 
intercepts and slopes for the fixed factors additively (i.e., dropping the interaction term) by faces. 
Restricted maximum likelihood estimation was used when reporting the LMM parameters (see 
Table 3 for parameter estimates). The model revealed an interaction between Vignette Emotion and 
Facial Emotion that was significant at <.001 alpha level (estimated by approximating to the z-
distribution). 
 (Table 3 about here)
As with Experiment 1, the interaction was explored with pairwise comparisons performed 
using the emmeans package in R with degrees of freedom approximated using the Kenward-Roger 
method. The pairwise comparisons were interpreted using a Bonferroni corrected alpha level 
of .025. Figure 3 contains the marginal means and standard errors calculated using the emmeans 
package.  Happy faces were recognised faster after happy vignettes than after sad vignettes, t 
(25.71) = 3.996, p < .001, while sad faces were recognised faster after sad vignettes than after 
happy vignettes, t (22.80) = 3.918, p < .001.4 In order to calculate the Bayes Factor to compare our 
Model 1 (i.e., with additive effects of Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion and with the interaction 
between them) to Model 2 (i.e., with additive effects of Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion, but 
4 The same pattern of results is found with a 2x2 ANOVA.
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with no interaction between them) we had to simplify the random effects structure; for both models 
we had random intercepts and slopes involving additive effects of Vignette Emotion and Face 
Emotion for participants and vignettes, and (uncorrelated) random intercepts and slopes involving 
Face Emotion for faces. This produced a Bayes Factor (BF12) of 8,886,111 in support of Model 1 
over Model 2.
(Figure 3 about here)
In our GLMM analysis for the accuracy data, the fixed effects were Vignette Emotion 
(Happy, Sad), Facial Emotion (Happy, Sad), and the interaction between these factors. Our model 
contained crossed random effects of participants and vignettes. The random effect of faces was 
dropped in order to arrive at a model that converged. The model with the most maximal effects 
structure that converged included only random intercepts by participants and by vignettes. The 
model revealed no main effects nor an interaction between Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion 
(see Table 4 for parameter estimates). Figure 4 contains the marginal means and standard errors 
calculated using the emmeans package. The Bayes Factor comparing Model 1 (i.e., with additive 
effects of Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion and with the interaction between them) to Model 2 
(i.e., with additive effects of Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion, but with no interaction between 
them) was calculated to be 6 (BF21) in support of Model 2 over Model 1.
(Table 4 about here) 
(Figure 4 about here) 
The RT results of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1. However, participants did 
not make more errors in recognising facial emotions when they were preceded by incongruent 
inferences compared to congruent ones. The Bayes Factor calculations suggest that we have 
positive evidence for a congruency effect in RTs (Model 1) and positive evidence for a lack of a 
congruency effect in accuracy (Model 2; Raftery, 1995, Wagenmakers, 2007).  Thus, the critical RT
analysis in Experiment 2 provided evidence for Barrett and colleagues’ theoretical extended 
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“language-as-context” account over Carroll and Russell’s (1996) theory of limited situational 
dominance, which predicted no difference in RTs. Consistent with previous empirical work on 
linguistic contexts, we also found no evidence for an accompanying difference in accuracy rates. 
This suggests that context is still influential on processing even when contexts and faces are of 
different valences (which strongly supports the extended language-as-context account) but that 
valence information is then likely used to override this processing cost to produce correct accuracy 
responses. This conclusion will be discussed further in the General Discussion with regards to both 
experiments.5
Comparison of the RT Congruency Effect between Experiments 1 and 2
Upon observing the apparent difference in the size of effects on RTs between the two 
experiments, we decided to examine whether the magnitude of the congruency effect associated 
with the RT data differed between Experiments 1 and 2 by conducting an additional, post-hoc LMM
analysis. As the congruency effect was symmetrical for each of our pairs of factors in Experiments 
1 and 2, we re-coded our conditions as Congruent vs. Incongruent.  We added Experiment as a new 
fixed effect, and re-coded our participant, vignette, and face factors uniquely. The other fixed effect 
was Congruency. The model included crossed random effects for Congruency by participants, 
vignettes, and faces, each with random intercepts and slopes. We used deviation coding for each of 
the fixed factors and restricted maximum likelihood estimation was used when reporting the 
parameters (see Table 5). This revealed effects of Congruency, Experiment and an interaction 
between them that was significant at the < .05 alpha level (estimated by approximating to the z-
distribution). The congruency effect was larger in Experiment 1 (719 ms) than it was in Experiment 
2 (343 ms). Figure 5 contains the marginal means and standard errors calculated using the emmeans
package.  
5 One possible alternative explanation is that certain words in the vignettes primed the emotion word response options at
a lexical level. We re-ran the analyses excluding vignettes that contained possible cue words, and the pattern of effects 
was the same. See the online supplemental material for full details of these analyses.
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(Table 5 about here)
(Figure 5 about here)
General Discussion
In both experiments, RTs were slower when participants identified facial emotions that 
conflicted with spontaneous aToM inferences made while reading previously presented vignettes 
that described social situations, regardless of whether the stimuli were of the same valence (anger / 
fear, Experiment 1) or of different valences (happiness / sadness, Experiment 2). However, 
participants only made more errors when the stimuli were of the same valence. Similarly, both 
Gendron et al. (2012) and Aviezer et al. (2008, Experiment 3) found evidence of context effects 
occurring during the perceptual process. Using eye-tracking, Aviezer et al. found that scanning 
patterns of faces reflected the emotion conveyed by the context (e.g., focusing on the lower face for 
a disgust context even when the face was intended to convey anger). The pattern of our accuracy 
and RT findings as well as our comparison of the congruency effects across the two experiments 
support Aviezer et al.’s contention that context effects are likely to be stronger the more 
“confusable” the emotions are (Hassin et al., 2013). However, our findings show that exposure to 
two successive, differently-valenced emotions can also significantly affect the perceptual process 
(Aveiezer et al.’s eye-tracking experiment used same-valenced emotions).
It appears that even when contexts are dissimilar from emotional facial expression targets in 
terms of valence, arousal, and quasi-physical information, processing takes longer when the context 
and the target facial expression convey different emotions compared to when they convey the same 
emotion. This suggests that context cannot be easily discounted even when valence information is 
useable for discriminating emotions. Indeed, a comparison of the congruency effects across the two 
experiments shows that the effect is stronger when the contextual and facial emotions match on 
quasi-physical features, pleasantness, and arousal (anger / fear). This comparison means that 
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although context does not have the same degree of influence on processing when the context and 
face are incongruent on quasi-physical information, pleasantness, and arousal (happiness / sadness),
it still has a significant impact on processing and the time taken to make a correct accuracy 
response. However, even this variation in the degree of contextual influence on processing does not 
support the limited situational dominance account (Carroll & Russell, 1996), which predicts no 
influence of context when the emotions portrayed by the context and the face differ on quasi-
physical information, pleasantness, and arousal (e.g., happiness / sadness). It must be noted that this
finding was a result of a post-hoc observation rather than an a priori prediction and should be 
interpreted with caution.
Thus, our findings fit best with an extended version of Barrett and colleagues’ “language-as-
context” hypothesis (Barrett & Kensinger, 2010; Barrett et al., 2007; Gendron et al., 2012; 
Lindquist et al., 2006). Their work suggests that activation of emotional concepts and related 
sensory information in memory through actions such as reading individual emotion labels shapes a 
person’s interpretation of an emotional facial expression. While it is possible that the option words 
flanking the faces in our experiments influenced the perception of the facial expressions in the way 
that Barrett et al. suggest (though these were held constant across the congruent and incongruent 
conditions so would not have influenced the congruency effect we observed), our findings clearly 
demonstrated that the broader simulations of social vignettes influenced the perception of the faces. 
Thus, it appears that it is not only simulations and concept activations generated at a lexical level 
that produce context effects but also operations at a pragmatic level. Indeed, while Barrett et al. 
suggest that context effects result from the re-activation of a person’s own previous emotional 
experiences through actions like reading emotion labels, our findings demonstrate that context 
effects can also result from inferences about the emotional experiences of other people in social 
situations. In other words, a person’s engagement of his/her aToM during the construction of the 
situation model of someone else’s circumstances can actively influence the decoding and 
interpretation of emotional facial expressions, regardless of valence. 
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At a fine-grained level, how does text comprehension lead to a specific aToM inference? 
Dynamic models of emotion processing, such as the Component Process Model (CPM; see Scherer,
2009), may be instructive. In the CPM account, events (such as those described in our vignettes) are
appraised along several dimensions proceeding through increasingly complex levels of processing. 
These dimensions determine relevance for the individual in terms of needs and goals, implications 
for the individual and his/her needs and goals in terms of the perceived outcomes of the events and 
their probability of occurrence (for example), how the individual might cope with the event given 
his/her relative control and power over it, and the normative significance of the event as compared 
to self and social standards (Scherer, 2001). According to Scherer, this appraisal process leads to 
changes in motivation and contributes to generating an active or potentially physical response; these
also influence the ongoing appraisal process. The integration of these continually updating 
appraisals, motivational changes, and potentials for action constitute the emotional experience, 
which includes subconscious and conscious levels (Scherer, 2009). Although the CPM describes an 
individual’s own experience of emotion, we cautiously speculate that it may also support aToM 
inferences by allowing simulations and appraisals of others’ experiences. Thus, in our vignettes, we 
suspect the simulated emotional experience continually updates as events unfold over the course of 
the narrative and as the reader appraises those events in terms of relevance, implications, coping 
potential, and normative significance for the character and his/her needs and goals based on the 
available information. Given the relative brevity of our vignettes and the lack of nuanced detail 
about the characters, the outcome emotions derived from the vignettes may approximate “modal 
emotions” that represent more commonly experienced patterns of appraisals, motivational changes, 
and potentials for action (e.g., anger, fear).
These emotional patterns, particularly the conscious aspects of them (which are labelled 
“feelings” by Scherer), may be found to be congruent or incongruent with the subsequent face. In 
the Anger example, readers would simulate and appraise Lucy’s situation. They would assess it as 
being highly relevant for her, involving an intentional thwarting of her goals, and being significant 
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for her self-esteem. These appraisals would be more typical of anger than of other modal emotions 
(Scherer, 2001).
This possible accounting of emotion derivation via the CPM fits, broadly, with the creation 
and updating of a reader’s situation model of the text. General and social knowledge are thought to 
form part of situation models, but this knowledge is also factored into the appraisal process 
described above (Scherer, 2009). Thus, the situation model may contain the comprehension of the 
text, general and social knowledge, and simulated emotional experiences which integrate to allow 
the production of elaborative aToM inferences about the character which then also enter the 
integrated situation model (see Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).  Indeed, emotional aspects of a text 
seem to activate brain regions that process affective information above and beyond language 
comprehension (Ferstl, Rinck, & von Cramon, 2005). The situation model is also thought to enter 
long-term memory (Zwaan, 1999). Thus, the enduring, integrated situation model which is formed 
and updated, in part, at the pragmatic level of the text and which includes incidental and elaborative
aToM inferences is likely a significant contextual factor that then affects the processing and 
response to a subsequently viewed face. This has important implications for our understanding of 
both empathy and mentalising, as well as how context affects the perception of facial emotions.
Barrett and Kensinger (2010) concluded that context is particularly salient when participants
are asked to decide upon a specific emotion (e.g., giving a specific label such as fear or disgust), 
rather than general affect (e.g., a more general positive or negative feeling such as approaching or 
avoiding a face). What is less clear, however, is whether, and under what circumstances, context 
can influence affective judgements. Gygax et al. (2003) demonstrated that readers make general 
affective inferences in an automatic and subconscious way, and it also appears that observers make 
general affective inferences about faces automatically and subconsciously (Barrett & Kensinger, 
2010). Kim et al. (2004) found that context effects produced different activation patterns in the 
amygdala even during passive exposure to stimuli. Because this is an under-explored area, future 
research should investigate what occurs when the affective information of context and face conflict 
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using a paradigm similar to ours but where the judgement task is unrelated to affect. This would 
demonstrate whether context influences processing at an implicit level when attention is specifically
directed to non-emotional aspects of the stimuli (Kim et al.’s participants may have directed their 
own attention to the stimuli’s emotional aspects). We predict that there would still be evidence of a 
context effect observed in processing measures (e.g., RTs, eye movements) when affective 
information in the context and the face is incongruent.
Despite our clear findings, we must acknowledge that it is possible that participants thought 
that they were to categorise the emotion presented in the vignette rather than the face, which could 
account for our findings. However, misunderstanding the task would likely have led to much lower 
accuracy rates of around 50% rather than the very high rates observed. Also, the experimental task 
was clearly detailed in the participant information sheet as well as two instruction screens 
immediately preceding the experiment, with the emphasis on judging the emotion in the face. 
Furthermore, our experiments did not include a baseline condition, meaning that we cannot 
conclude whether the context effects observed are evidence of facilitation in the congruent 
conditions or suppression in the incongruent conditions. However, this is a question that can be 
investigated in future work. Instead, our experiments successfully met our aims of (1) exploring 
whether, and the extent to which, spontaneous, incidental aToM inferences act as a contextual 
influence on the identification of subsequent emotional facial expressions and (2) discovering which
theoretical model could better account for our pattern of findings.
The experiments presented here demonstrated that people make inferences about someone 
else’s mental and emotional state that are richer and more detailed than superficial impressions 
about affective valence. These inferences are extracted from the pragmatic level of a text, and, 
therefore, our novel findings suggest that language acts as a contextual influence to the recognition 
of emotional facial expressions for both same and different valences. To borrow the phrasing of 
the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), although a general belief 
exists that people “read” others’ facial expressions in order to make inferences about their 
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emotional states, our findings show that people also “write” such inferences onto the emotional 
faces of others.
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Table 1: Parameter estimates following the linear mixed effects model reaction time analysis for
Experiment 1.
      b    SE        t
Intercept 2302.02 211.45 10.887
Vignette Emotion -45.35 136.91 -0.331
Facial Emotion -116.17 153.21 -0.758
Interaction -1399.70 218.17 -6.416*
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Table 2: Parameter estimates following the generalized linear mixed effects model accuracy 
analysis for Experiment 1.
      b    SE        z
Intercept 3.21 0.27 11.677
Vignette Emotion 0.46 0.37 1.263
Facial Emotion -0.37 0.33 -1.136
Interaction 3.45 0.66 5.236*
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Table 3: Parameter estimates following the linear mixed effects model reaction time analysis for 
Experiment 2.
      b    SE        t
Intercept 1488.07 85.02 17.503
Vignette Emotion -31.15 50.13 -0.621
Facial Emotion -71.95 48.87 -1.472
Interaction -689.66 142.83 -4.828*
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Table 4: Parameter estimates following the generalized linear mixed effects model accuracy 
analysis for Experiment 2.
      b    SE        z
Intercept 4.72 0.54 8.691
Vignette Emotion -0.001 0.57 -0.002
Facial Emotion -0.92 0.52 -1.756
Interaction 1.79 1.04 1.718
Affective theory of mind inferences     36
Table 5: Parameter estimates following the linear mixed effects model reaction time analysis 
comparing Experiments 1 and 2.
      b    SE        t
Intercept 1897.48 118.32 16.037
Congruency -531.30 90.57 -5.866
Experiment 819.22 236.63 3.462
Interaction -376.36 181.14 -2.078*
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Figure 1
Means and SEs for RTs for Experiment 1
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Figure 2
Means and SEs for Accuracy for Experiment 1
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Figure 3
Means and SEs for RTs for Experiment 2
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Figure 4
Means and SEs for Accuracy for Experiment 2
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Figure 5
Means and SEs for RTs comparing Experiments 1 and 2
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Affective theory of mind inferences contextually influence the recognition of emotional facial
expressions
SUPPLEMENTAL ONLINE MATERIAL
Description of vignette development
Experiment 1
During the vignette development phase, 60 vignettes implying anger, fear, or sadness were 
subjected to an online pre-test with 30 different participants (23 female; mean age = 28.10 years, 
SD = 9.08 years). The exclusion criteria were the same as for the main experiment. They were 
eligible to enter the voucher prize draw and earned participation credits where suitable. Participants 
were asked to read each vignette and select the single best emotion (from sad, angry, afraid, or 
surprised) that described what the main character was feeling at the end of the vignette. Accuracy 
rates for the vignettes were calculated; and, for each category, the 16 vignettes with the highest 
accuracy ratings were selected. In order to determine which two categories were best matched in 
terms of their implied emotions, the accuracy rates for each vignette category were subjected to a 
one-way within-subjects ANOVA with emotion as the independent variable and accuracy as the 
dependent, F (2, 58) = 16.42, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons showed that the sad vignettes had a 
worse mean accuracy rate (82.24%, SD = 12.63%) than both the angry (95.15%, SD = 7.07%; p 
< .001) and the fearful (91.85%, SD = 7.74%; p < .001) vignettes. The accuracy rates of the angry 
and fearful vignettes did not differ, p = .35. Thus, the 32 angry and fearful vignettes were used in 
Experiment 1.
Experiment 2
In the development phase, 40 vignettes conveying happiness or sadness were subject to an 
online pre-test in which 30 Psychology students (26 female; mean age = 23.21 years, SD = 9.28 
years) took part for participation credits; they did not participate in the main experiment or in 
Experiment 1 or its pre-test. The exclusion criteria were the same as for Experiment 1. One 
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additional pre-test participant’s data were excluded because his/her participation duration was less 
than four minutes (other participants’ mean participation duration = 20.45 minutes, SD = 9.49), and 
the researchers agreed that it was unlikely that 40 vignettes could have been thoroughly read in such
a short time period. After reading each vignette, participants were asked to select the single best 
emotion (from surprised, happy, sad, and afraid) that described how the main character felt at the 
end of the vignette. The 16 happy and 16 sad vignettes with the highest rates of recognition were 
selected, and these were not significantly different, t (29) = 0.143, p = .89; happy mean = 85.21%, 
SD = 11.31%; sad mean = 84.79%, SD = 12.47%.
 
Vignettes for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
Practice items (both experiments):
(ANGER) Max’s girlfriend was passionate but had a big temper. One Saturday, she got into an 
argument with him and accused him of going after her best friend. Max tried to calm her down, but 
she only started shouting more loudly. Then, she picked up Max’s prize digital camera and smashed
it on the floor.
(SADNESS) Matthew was getting married to his long-time girlfriend, and the wedding day had 
arrived. He and his best man got dressed and got the rings together, and Matthew’s parents came to 
congratulate him and wish him well. Then Matthew’s phone rang. It was his wife-to-be, saying that 
she just couldn’t go through with the wedding.
(DISGUST) Claire was a modest person who always tried to be polite. She had recently started 
University and wanted to meet new people and make friends. She attended a party at the student 
Affective theory of mind inferences     44
union pub and fell into conversation with a few other new students. One of the others told a very 
crude and racist joke, and everyone laughed except Claire.
Experiment 1
Experimental items:
FEAR MALE:
Tom was walking home from his Saturday evening shift as a chef in a busy city centre restaurant. 
The quickest route home took him through some alleyways, but they were usually quiet. On this 
evening, he came upon two men in an alley who were arguing and holding broken bottles. Then the 
men saw Tom and began walking towards him. 
Simon took his new girlfriend out to a National Park for a long walk. After a while, they lost their 
way and ended up missing lunch. Simon’s new girlfriend began to feel faint and started to look 
pale. She explained that she was diabetic and that she had left her insulin back in the car, which was
nearly a mile away.
Allan was looking after his 3 year old nephew for the day, so he took the little boy to visit the 
beach. The beach was very crowded when they arrived so they found a spot near the seafront to 
make sand castles. Allan bent down to fill a bucket with sand. When he stood up, he did not see his 
nephew anywhere.
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Richard was out late one night at a pub when he realised he had run out of money. He told his 
friends that he was just going out to a cashpoint. There were very few people around. As Richard 
was typing in his PIN, he heard footsteps behind him and very loud breathing.
Henry’s best friend had bought a new car and asked Henry to come along for the first drive. As they
got onto the motorway, the friend moved into the fast lane and said he wanted to see how fast the 
car could go. Henry said there were too many other cars on the motorway and that it would be really
dangerous. Henry’s friend laughed and pushed the accelerator to the floor.
Mike went to the supermarket one evening for his weekly shop. As he went around the aisles, he 
noticed a man in a black hoodie who always seemed to be close by. On the last aisle, Mike looked 
straight at the man who immediately turned away. As Mike left and walked through the dark car 
park, he noticed the man walking some distance behind him.
David was at a large political rally, protesting student fees. The man standing next to him had 
gotten increasingly loud and agitated over the past hour. As David looked on, the man started 
pushing a police officer. Others started to join in, yelling and shoving the other officers.
Dan had joined the university rugby team at the beginning of his first semester. When he joined, the
older boys told him he and the other freshers would have to go through initiation tests before he 
could play in a match. Dan had heard that the initiations involved a lot of alcohol and being made to
strip, and that most years, someone ended up in hospital. When he arrived for his initiation, he was 
told that he would have to walk along a railway track for a mile without stopping or getting off.
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FEAR FEMALE:
Lindsey had been on her way to a party, when she realised she was lost in an unfamiliar part of 
town. It was dark, and there were very few people around. She saw a man standing at a bus stop and
went to ask directions. When she approached him, she saw that he was cleaning a large knife.
Amanda had arranged to meet her friend at a local pub. She arrived early and decided to wait 
outside the pub. Just then, a man came and stood very close to her and began asking her all kinds of 
questions. Amanda told him that she had to go and she started walking off home. As she walked 
away, she noticed that the man was following her.
Vicky and her boyfriend had stayed out too late to catch a bus, so they decided to walk home 
instead. Vicky’s boyfriend decided to climb over a high wall as shortcut, even though Vicky had 
said they should walk the long way around. When Vicky’s boyfriend was at the top, he slipped and 
fell to the ground on the other side. She heard a loud cracking sound as he landed.
Liliana had to work late one bank holiday. When she was finished, she realised that there were no 
buses running and she would have to walk home. The shortest route was through a park, but it was 
dark and there were hardly any other people around. As she crossed the park, she heard heavy 
footsteps coming up behind her.
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Michelle and her brother had been out late to a party, and they were very drunk as they walked 
home. Michelle stopped to tie her shoe while her brother kept walking. As she looked up, she saw 
her brother stumble towards the busy road. She shouted as her brother stepped out into the road.
Lisa was working late at the library one night. There was hardly anyone around, but then a guy 
came and sat down right at her table. A few minutes later, Lisa got up to use the toilet. When she 
came back, the guy started to stare at her.
Gemma and her boyfriend were apart for a few days as he had travelled to London with a group of 
friends. They were all interested in archaeology and had tickets to a special exhibition that day at a 
large museum. Gemma sat down in her living room to watch some telly. When she turned on the 
news, she heard the newsreader report that there was a bomb threat to the museum and that special 
police units were going in.
Janine and her friends were out at a pub late one night when a very loud group of drunk men came 
in. They shouted at the barman and made some lewd comments to some women sitting near the bar.
Janine and her friends decided to go. As they stood up and grabbed their coats, one of the men 
turned around and headed towards Janine’s group.
ANGER MALE:
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Tim was in a band that was doing a small tour around Europe. They took a flight to Paris, where 
their first gig was going to be the following evening. At baggage claim, Tim’s guitar never came 
out. The airline representative told Tim the guitar would arrive three days later and they could not 
compensate him for the delay.
Steven purchased a new bike after saving for months to get the best bike he could afford, as he was 
a keen cyclist and frequently cycled into work. One morning, Steven locked his new bicycle in the 
bike shed outside his workplace. When he returned after work, he found that all the bicycle seats 
had been stolen. Steven had to push his bike for two miles to get home.
After several months of unemployment, Noah decided to use a recruitment agency to improve his 
chances of finding a job. He forwarded his CV to them and paid a large upfront fee. After a few 
weeks of no contact, Noah telephoned the agency. The woman told him that it appeared that his CV 
had been lost and, thus, he had not been put forward for any jobs.
John lived in a shared house while at university with four other lads. Every six months the landlord 
came round for an inspection of the property, so they all pitched in and cleaned the house from top 
to bottom. When the next inspection day arrived, John’s housemates filled his room with all the 
rubbish they had collected. When the landlord saw the mess, he told John that he was terminating 
his contract. 
George was interested in his family history, and his prized possessions were his great-grandfather’s 
World War I medals. One day, George went to his room to find the medals bent and broken off their
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chains. George’s flatmate told him he had no idea what had happened. A few weeks later, the 
flatmate told George that he had broken them when he was showing some friends.
Sean took his elderly mother to the local supermarket every Saturday for her weekly shop. The car 
park was very full and Sean had to drive around a few times until he noticed someone leaving. As 
Sean was waiting for the car to move out of the way, another person drove around Sean’s car and 
into the parking space. When Sean honked his horn, the other driver didn’t move.
Kevin’s flatmate was unemployed and was really struggling with money. Kevin had offered to 
cover his rent for a while, and had even starting giving some money to the flatmate to buy some 
food instead of putting it into his savings. One day, the flatmate came home from the shops with 
two big bags. When Kevin looked in, there was no food but several DVDs, some alcohol, and a 
computer game instead.
Craig was waiting for his sister to give him a lift to an important doctor’s appointment, but she was 
late. The GP’s surgery was oversubscribed and appointments were always difficult to come by. 
When Craig phoned his sister to see where she was, she said that she had only just woken up and 
would be there in thirty minutes. Craig missed his appointment.
ANGER FEMALE:
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Bernadette worked in a busy city centre shoe shop during the summer break from university. Her 
manager asked her to reorganise the stock room into alphabetical order to help other staff members 
find stock quickly. Bernadette spent two full days organising the stock. When she returned to work 
after a day off, she found that the stock room was a huge mess and that other staff members were 
putting stock in all the wrong places.
Stacey had waited for months for the release of a new science fiction film. While waiting in the 
queue with her younger brother to buy tickets for the 3D showing, Stacey saw three men push into 
the line in front of her. When Stacey got to the counter, the cashier told her that he had just sold the 
last tickets to the three men. Stacey and her brother had to wait until the next day.
Louise had arranged for a repairman to service her boiler as it was faulty. Because the repairman 
was unable to specify an appointment time, Louise had to take the whole day off from work as 
annual leave. Late in the day, the repairman still had not come so Louise phoned his company to ask
when he might turn up. The man on the end of the phone laughed and told her that the repairman 
had taken the day off.
Jacquie had an important interview, and her flatmate was going to drive her there. As she got ready,
Jacquie noticed that the flatmate was only just getting out of bed. Jacquie reminded her flatmate that
she had to get there in a hurry and did not want to be late. The flatmate replied that he’d forgotten to
tell Jacquie that his car had broken down a few days ago and he wouldn’t be able to drive her to the 
interview.
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Steph really wanted to buy the new iPhone on its release day and had camped out overnight be first 
in the queue. As the opening time approached, Steph realised she couldn’t wait any longer to use 
the loo. The guy behind her promised to hold her spot, but when she came back, the guy was sitting 
on the pavement playing with his new phone while hundreds of others flooded into the shop. He 
laughed and wished her better luck next time.
Emma had started a romantic relationship with a colleague at her new job. As Christmas was fast 
approaching, Emma and her colleagues decided to go into town for a few festive drinks. 
Throughout the evening, Emma noticed that a female co-worker kept sitting close and touching her 
boyfriend’s thigh. The boyfriend kept stroking the woman’s hair.
Violet spent a lot of money on a beautiful new dress for the uni ball. When she got home and tried it
on with her new shoes, she discovered a big yellow stain on the back of the dress. She brought it 
back to the shop and showed the shop manager. The manager said the dress had not been like that 
when Violet had bought it and refused to give her a refund.
Lucy worked part-time for a local newspaper and had been working on a big story about a 
campaign to save the historic town hall. She had even worked overtime and had spent her own 
money to interview lots of residents and do all the research. Her editor praised Lucy for all her hard 
work and told her it would be on the front page. When Lucy bought the paper the next day, she saw 
her editor had put his own name on the report.
Experiment 2
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Experimental items:
HAPPY FEMALE:
Danielle entered a national poetry contest. One day a letter arrived in the post which said that she 
was a finalist and was invited to London to read her poem to the judges of the final round. At the 
event, all the final poems were very good. After the voting was over, the chief judge approached her
and told her that she had written a wonderful poem that had really moved all the panel members.
Leigh had been helping her son study for his GCSE maths exam, as it was a subject that he really 
struggled with. They studied and worked together for nearly two hours every day in the weeks 
leading up to the exam. In August, Leigh’s son went to his school to find out his results while she 
waited at home. Leigh’s phone rang, and it was her son telling her that he had received a B.
Nicole and her young daughter decided to go to the zoo. Once they were there, they walked around 
and saw lots of interesting animals. They talked about why the animals all looked so different, and 
then they had a picnic lunch near the giraffes. Finally, they shared some ice cream before heading 
home, hand in hand.
Vivian’s family was having a big family reunion weekend. It had been longer than anyone could 
remember that all the extended family had been together. Vivian hosted the first event, a barbecue, 
at her house; and everyone stayed late into the night, sharing stories and talking. Vivian herself 
spent a long time chatting with everyone, catching up and getting to know her relatives better.
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Winnie was the captain of her University’s quiz show team. The team had practiced for months and 
knew each other’s strengths and weaknesses well. The final round was tough, but they managed to 
work out many difficult answers together. When the final bell rang, the host announced that Winnie 
and her team had won by five points. 
Hannah and her mum shopped together and had lunch together once a month. This past Saturday, 
her mum took Hannah to a special restaurant for a particularly fancy meal. Hannah offered to pay 
for half, but her mum wouldn’t accept the offer. Her mum said she was so proud of Hannah’s 
achievements at work recently that she wanted to give her a special treat.
Laura and her partner were looking for a house to buy. They had seen a lot, but none had felt right. 
At the end of a long day, they had arrived at the last house they were to view. As soon as Laura and 
her partner stepped in, Laura knew it was the right house. The owner described all the wonderful 
memories she’d had in the house and said she hoped whoever bought it would make lots of 
memories there too.
Becky lived in the centre of London, where it rarely snowed. One week after Christmas, it was very 
cold and snow blanketed the area. Becky heard some shouting outside and saw some of her 
neighbours having a snowball fight in the street. She headed outside where she joined in with 
everyone, and later they made a snowman and some snow angels too.
HAPPY MALE:
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Johnny was on the University’s football team. They had recently won an important match because 
Johnny has scored the winning goal. The team decided to go out to the pub to celebrate. Johnny’s 
team members congratulated him and bought his drinks all evening.
Andrew was in danger of failing his introductory history module. He had decided to become more 
studious and had seen his tutor on a few occasions to discuss how he could improve his marks. 
When it was time for the next hand-back, the tutor asked Andrew to come by her office. She told 
him that he had received a 65.
Grant’s University had its own weekly student newspaper, and he had worked as a reporter and 
copy editor on it for two years. He decided to apply to become the newspaper’s editor when the 
position became open in his final year. During the interview, he spoke passionately about his 
journalism work. A few hours later, the panel telephoned him to say that he was going to be the new
editor.
Joe and three of his friends were competing in a relay marathon run for charity. Joe had the last leg 
and as he approached the finish line, he looked at the race clock. He saw that they were going to set 
a new best team time. His teammates ran onto the route screaming wildly and proceeded to run the 
last hundred metres with him.
Thomas attended the induction events at his new University. The students’ union put on a treasure 
hunt around campus and randomly assigned the students to teams. Thomas and his team got on 
well, helping each other out with the clues as they raced around the campus to the various locations.
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They didn’t win, but they all planned to meet that night for drinks, and Thomas exchanged phone 
numbers with all of them.
Harry had a close-knit group of friends from school, with whom he still kept in touch even after 
many years. They agreed to meet for a weekend in their hometown after several years of not seeing 
each other. As Harry got off the train, he saw his three friends on the platform, talking and laughing 
together. As they noticed him, they all shouted to him and started waving.
Ethan had planned a special day for his girlfriend’s birthday. He collected her in the afternoon with 
a bouquet of roses. Then, he took her rowing on the river. Finally, he took her to a cocktail bar and 
a fancy restaurant. As they walked home, she told him that she loved him.
Mitch and his son often played football together. They went to the park every Saturday afternoon to 
play for a few hours. One Saturday, Mitch’s son did a particularly impressive header which Mitch 
praised. When they were leaving, Mitch’s son told him that he’d had a really great time.
SAD FEMALE:
Jessica was interested in drama and decided to audition for the drama society’s new play. She 
practiced a monologue and even had her friends critique her acting. At the audition, Jessica gave it 
her all. When the audition was over, the drama society thanked her for coming but said that she 
would not receive a role in the play.
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Helen had a favourite independent coffee shop that she visited about every other day. She had 
gotten to know the shopkeepers well because usually there were only a few other customers in the 
shop. One day, Helen saw a sign which said that the coffee shop would be closing in a week. When 
she enquired about it with the shopkeeper, he told her that they just were not making enough money
and had to close.
Jane and her brother had always been very close. While Jane had stayed close to home, her brother 
had lived in Spain for several years. Her brother was going to arrive the next day for a long visit, 
and it was the first time in a year that they would see each other. That evening, Jane’s brother rang 
to say that he had to postpone his trip for a couple of weeks because his son had taken ill.
Melissa and her best friend were very close and always did everything together. They had even 
decided to go to the same University, although they studied different courses. While Melissa had 
found her work and exams to be okay, the friend had always struggled. One day, the friend told 
Melissa that she had failed too many times and that she had decided to withdraw.
Sarah and her best friend wanted to rent a flat together for their final year at University. Although 
Sarah’s parents supported her financially, her friend was almost always broke. They began 
searching for cheap flats. But, the next time they met for coffee, the friend told Sarah that she didn’t
have enough money to help rent the flat and that she was going to live at home.
Heather had volunteered at a summer holiday camp for children. She had gotten to know lots of the 
children well and had made good friends with the other volunteers. Now that it was the end of the 
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summer, everyone was packing up to go home. She watched as the children that she had looked 
after found their parents and climbed into their cars.
Alice’s grandmother was very old and had lived in a nursing home for the past five years. Alice 
visited her grandmother weekly, and they often played card games together. Recently, the 
grandmother had developed pains in her legs. The next time that Alice visited, she saw that her 
grandmother could not get out of bed.
Joanna played doubles tennis with her best friend. They made a good team, but Joanna had injured 
her shoulder badly in a match last year. Although she continued to play, her shoulder was hurting 
more and more. After having a chat with her friend and seeing her GP, Joanna and her friend 
decided that it was better for her health that Joanna stop playing.
SAD MALE:
Oliver was a caring person and got to know a few of the Big Issue sellers around town. He always 
stopped to have a chat and buy a new issue. One day he realised that he had not seen one of the 
guys for quite a while. He inquired about him with one of the other sellers, who said that the man 
had caught pneumonia and was very poorly in hospital.
Sam had been unemployed for some time despite sending out hundreds of job applications. He lived
frugally although sometimes he did not have money to buy enough food. A few days ago, he had 
had a job interview that seemed to go very well. When his phone rang, it was the chief of the 
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interview panel saying that Sam was an impressive candidate but that they had decided to give the 
job to someone else.
Adam and his wife were getting divorced. It was hard on everyone, particularly their ten-year old 
son. One afternoon, Adam found his son crying in his bedroom. When he asked what the matter 
was, the son said that he wanted to live with his mother.
Ian and his girlfriend had been together for a long time, but they had been having a difficult time 
recently. They had argued a lot but had tried to stick together. They had even been to see a 
relationship counsellor. The next time Ian saw his girlfriend, she said that she wanted to split up.
Aaron and his wife had always wanted to have children. They had been trying to get pregnant for a 
couple of years but without success. They had recently been to get their fertility tested. When they 
visited the clinic to get the results, the doctor told them that Aaron had a fertility problem and that 
they would not be able to have children.
Steve had become good friends with his neighbour, and they had lived next door to each other for 
the past two years. Recently, the neighbour had gotten a new job in a different city and Steve had 
helped him pack up his house. Steve had even held a goodbye party for him. The next morning, 
Steve was looking out the window when he saw the removal men pull up.
Neil and his partner had been spending less and less time together. They were both often very busy 
with work, and his partner was spending more time with her friends. When Neil and his partner 
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would go out together, there were often long silences. The next time they went out together, Neil’s 
partner said that they should see other people.
James decided to enter a crossword contest run by a national newspaper. The crossword was very 
difficult, and he had to work for several days to solve it. He sent his solution to the newspaper; and 
a few weeks later, he received a reply. The letter said that he had solved all but two of the clues 
correctly but that he had not won the contest.
FILLER MATERIALS
DISGUST
Joseph was starting a new job for the summer, and he was keen to get to know his co-workers. At 
lunchtime, the guy at the next desk invited Joseph down to the canteen with him. They got their 
trays of food and sat down. Joseph watched as his co-worker ate his entire lunch with his hands, 
dropping food down his shirt and licking his fingers loudly.
Denise went on a date with a guy she had met at a party. She had taken care to look her best. They 
went to a nice restaurant and had a meal of three courses and a bottle of wine. Right after finishing 
his dessert, Denise’s date belched loudly without covering his mouth.
Jim worked as a personal shopper in men’s clothing in a big department store. One day, an older 
man came in for his hour-long appointment. Jim noticed that he had dried food all over his front and
greasy hair. As the man approached, Jim realised that he smelled very strongly of body odour.
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Grace and her sister lived far apart and rarely saw each other. Now, Grace’s sister was coming to 
stay for the weekend and she had planned a fun weekend that included attending a party with all of 
her friends. At the party, Grace’s sister drunk a lot and started swearing loudly. Then on the walk 
home, she vomited all over Grace’s shoes.
Liz had a friend who loved to play practical jokes. She had told him that she did not like practical 
jokes and did not think they were very funny. Liz’s friend invited their group around for dinner one 
evening. As Liz stirred her soup, she saw a big hairy spider float to the surface.
Claudia and her friends had booked a holiday to America. On the plane, they had to split up and 
Claudia had ended up sitting next to an older man. He drank throughout the flight and had eaten so 
messily that he had spilled gravy all over Claudia’s bags. Then he fell asleep on Claudia’s shoulder,
snoring loudly and drooling all over her shirt.
Jasper had worked in a number of restaurants as a chef and was now shortlisted for a job at an 
exclusive restaurant. He had worked hard to create a new dish that would impress the head chef at 
his interview. When he brought out his dish for the chef to try, he saw that the man was unsteady on
his feet and smelled heavily of alcohol. Then the man sneezed all over Jasper’s dish and promptly 
passed out.
Eric was close to his grandmother, who was getting very old and frail. In fact, she had difficulty 
walking and so hardly left the house any more. Eric decided to visit her for a couple of weeks over 
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the summer. When he walked into her house, Eric discovered rubbish piled high all over, including 
rotting food on the kitchen surfaces.
SURPRISE:
Jennifer and her ex-flatmate had separated on bad terms after having a big row about rent payments.
Jennifer had moved to a new place and had not seen her ex-flatmate in four years. One night, 
Jennifer and her friends went to a birthday party. She realized that there were only six guests and 
one of them was her ex-flatmate.
Harriet had stayed late at her job one night to finish off some work. Her co-workers had all gone a 
couple of hours before. When she took a break, she decided to turn on some loud music and sing 
along. As she was dancing around, she turned around to see her boss standing in the doorway.
Julia had arrived at the city’s theatre as she was an understudy for a new play. She had gotten there 
very early so she could do her makeup, do some warm-up exercises, and practice her monologue a 
few times. A few minutes after she had arrived, the director’s assistant found her backstage. He said
that the lineup had changed and that she would be going on in five minutes.
Henrietta was out in the middle of town one Saturday when a reporter for the local newspaper 
approached her. He asked if he could interview her about some of the planning controversies going 
on in the town centre. Henrietta told him what she thought and even let her picture be taken. When 
the newspaper arrived at her house the next week, she saw that her picture was on the front page, 
with one of her quotes even used as the main headline.
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Marnie and her friends decided to plan an amazing night out after their exams had finished. They 
had had a stressful few weeks, but now that the night had arrived, Marnie took her time to look her 
best. She was running very late, so she made took a taxi to the pub rather than take the bus. As she 
looked around the pub, Marnie realised that her friends were not there.
Anna was at home one Saturday just having a lazy day. Suddenly, her doorbell rang. When Anna 
answered the door, she saw a tall woman with long dark hair. The woman apologised for bothering 
Anna and then said she was researching her family background and discovered that Anna was her 
long-lost younger sister.
Sadie’s best friend had recently left a long relationship. At Sadie’s urging, the friend had gone out 
and had started to date a few guys. Sadie was now going to meet the friend’s new boyfriend. When 
Sadie arrived at the friend’s house, the friend announced that she had eloped was now married.
Jolene was riding the bus to work early one morning. The bus was very crowded, but most people 
were by themselves and were very quiet. At the next stop, several people got on and a tall man had 
to stand next to Jolene. He turned to her and then suddenly burst into an operatic song.
Paul’s girlfriend had always been shy and meek. She always opened up with Paul, but other people 
thought she was mousy. He knew she was going through a difficult time and he tried to be 
supportive. The next time Paul went to her flat, he saw that she had gotten a large tattoo of a dragon
across her back.
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Seb enjoyed football but he had never had much talent for it. Even so, he had joined the 
University’s team as a trainer and assistant. He enjoyed being close to the action and helping out his
teammates with water and stretches during the match. At the next match, the manager told him that 
so many of the players had the flu that Seb would have to play in order to make up a full team.
Christopher was out pulling some weeds in his garden on a hot day. He had his headphones on and 
was singing and dancing as he worked. He turned around to put some more weeds in his 
wheelbarrow. It was then that he saw his neighbour peering over the fence, watching him and 
laughing.
Joel had always been very close to his parents, particularly as he was an only child. He had recently 
moved out to a flat of his own, but he saw his parents regularly. One Sunday when he visited for 
lunch, his parents asked him to sit down. They apologised for not discussing it before and then told 
Joel they loved him but that he was adopted.
Aidan’s parents had split up when he was a baby, and he had not seen his father since he was a 
toddler. Eventually, his mother had remarried and Aidan was very close to his stepfather. One day, 
the doorbell rang and an older man was standing on the step. Aidan realised that the man was his 
father.
Alex was an only child and didn’t have many living relatives. One day, when he was visiting his 
parents, they got a visit from a lawyer. The lawyer explained that she was executing the will of 
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someone who turned out to be a distant aunt who had amassed a large fortune. The lawyer then said 
that the aunt was leaving Alex and his parents ten million pounds.
Nathan’s flatmate had been away visiting his family for a week. Although Nathan was working late 
a lot, he’d made good use of having the flat to himself – listening to music loudly, watching 
whatever he wanted on TV, and the like. One evening when he returned from work, he noticed that 
a light was on in the flat. When he unlocked the door, he saw his flatmate was back and had invited 
over dozens of people, who were all dancing, drinking, and generally trashing the flat.
Jonathon and his wife had wanted children for a long time, and finally they were pregnant. They 
didn’t have much money, but they planned to give their child the best life they could. They went to 
the hospital to have the first scan. After a few minutes, the technician told them that they would be 
having triplets.
Affective theory of mind inferences     65
Re-analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 to discover any effect of lexical priming
Introduction
One possible explanation for the results is that the effects are being driven by a subset of 
vignettes that contain individual words that prime one or the other of the emotional response 
options. This would mean that participants were effectively responding to a lexical prime in some 
vignettes rather than to the subsequently presented facial emotion. To address this alternative 
explanation, we re-ran our analyses for both experiments in which we removed data that was 
derived from vignettes that contained possible cue words for our emotional response options.
To identify relevant possible lexical cue words for “angry,” “fearful,” “happy,” and “sad,” 
we utilised the Small World of Words free association English database (SWOW; S. De Deyne, 
personal communication, 15 January 2018; see De Deyne, Navarro, & Storms, 2013, for the 
procedure of constructing the SWOW Dutch database). The SWOW database offers the advantage 
over similar databases (e.g., the University of South Florida Free Association Norms; Nelson, 
McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998) that the associations have been more recently collected and are, 
therefore, more up-to-date. Second, these data were collected from English speakers globally, 
meaning that the associations are less reflective of any particular dialect. 
For the SWOW database, four samples of one hundred participants each were asked to 
generate three responses that they freely associated with “angry,” “fearful, “happy,” or “sad.” 
Because the item words that SWOW participants are asked to respond to are generated randomly, it 
is possible that some participants may have appeared in more than one of these samples. Thus, the 
SWOW database gave us an initial pool of three hundred lexical associations for each emotion 
response option. For each pool, we calculated frequencies for each cue (regardless of whether the 
cues were first, second, or third associations). We then discarded all cues that had a frequency of 
one as these may have reflected idiosyncratic associations. Thus, all cues that we then used had at 
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least two SWOW participants associate that cue with the relevant emotional response option. We 
then identified the vignettes that contained any of these cue words in order to exclude them from the
re-analysis. If a vignette contained (for example) an adjectival or adverbial form of a noun cue, we 
followed a rule that that vignette should also be excluded from the reanalysis. The searched cue 
words and the vignettes in which any were found (as identified by the main character’s name) can 
be found in Tables 1 and 2. Four vignettes were excluded from the re-analysis of Experiment 1 (all 
fearful) and five from Experiment 2 (three happy and two sad).
(Table 1 about here)
(Table 2 about here)
Results for re-analysis of Experiment 1
Initially, we utilised arousal as a covariate but the pattern of results were the same: the 
models with and without arousal were not significantly different from each other and the key 
interaction remained significant in the model using arousal. Therefore, here we fully report the re-
analysis without arousal as a covariate. In our LMM analysis for the RT data, the fixed effects were 
Vignette Emotion (Fear, Anger), Facial Emotion (Fear, Anger), and the interaction between these 
factors. We used deviation coding for each of the experimental factors. Our model contained 
crossed random effects for participants, vignettes, and faces. The model with the most maximal 
effects structure that converged included random intercepts and additive slopes for both fixed 
factors by participants, and by vignettes, and random intercepts and slopes for the Facial Emotion 
factor by faces. Restricted maximum likelihood estimation was used when reporting the linear 
mixed model parameters (see Table 3 for parameter estimates). The model revealed an interaction 
between Vignette Emotion and Facial Emotion that was significant at <.001 alpha level (estimated 
by approximating to the z-distribution). 
(Table 3 about here)
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The interaction was explored with pairwise comparisons performed using the emmeans 
package in R (Lenth, Love & Hervé, 2017) with degrees of freedom approximated using the 
Kenward-Roger method. The pairwise comparisons were interpreted using a Bonferroni-corrected 
alpha level of .025. Table 4 contains the marginal means and standard errors calculated using the 
emmeans package. They show that RTs were slower for identifying a facial emotion when it 
mismatched the vignette emotion. Angry faces were recognised faster after angry vignettes than 
after fearful vignettes, t (21.73) = 3.491, p = .002, while fearful faces were recognised faster after 
fearful vignettes than after angry vignettes, t (25.76) = 4.407 p = .002. 
(Table 4 about here)
In our GLMM analysis for the accuracy data, the fixed effects were Vignette Emotion (Fear,
Anger), Facial Emotion (Fear, Anger), and the interaction between these factors. Our model 
contained crossed random effects of participants and vignettes. The random effect of faces was 
dropped in order to arrive at a model that converged. The model with the most maximal effects 
structure that converged included only random intercepts by participants and by vignettes (see 
Table 5 for parameter estimates). The model revealed an interaction between Vignette Emotion and 
Facial Emotion that was significant at < .001 alpha level (based on the z-distribution).
(Table 5 about here)
The interaction was explored with contrasts performed using the emmeans package in R on 
the log odds ratio scale. The pairwise comparisons were interpreted using a Bonferroni-corrected 
alpha level of .025. Table 4 contains the marginal means and standard errors calculated using the 
emmeans package. Accuracy decreased when identifying facial emotions that mismatched the 
preceding vignette emotions. Angry faces were responded to with higher accuracy after angry 
vignettes than after fearful vignettes, z = 4.101, p < .001, while fearful faces were responded to with
higher accuracy after fearful vignettes than after angry vignettes, z = 2.797, p = .0052. 
Results for re-analysis of Experiment 2
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A LMM was fitted to the RT data, following the same procedure used the re-analysis of 
Experiment 1. The fixed effects were Vignette Emotion (Happy, Sad), Facial Emotion (Happy, 
Sad), and the interaction between these factors. We used deviation coding for each of the 
experimental factors. Our model contained crossed random effects for participants, vignettes, and 
faces. The model with the most maximal effects structure that converged included random 
intercepts and additive slopes for both fixed effects by participants, by vignettes, and by faces. 
Restricted maximum likelihood estimation was used when reporting the LMM parameters (see 
Table 6 for parameter estimates). The model revealed an interaction between Vignette Emotion and 
Facial Emotion that was significant at <.001 alpha level (estimated by approximating to the z-
distribution). 
 (Table 6 about here)
As with Experiment 1, the interaction was explored with pairwise comparisons performed 
using the emmeans package in R (Lenth et al., 2017) with degrees of freedom approximated using 
the Kenward-Roger method. The pairwise comparisons were interpreted using a Bonferroni 
corrected alpha level of .025. Table 4 contains the marginal means and standard errors calculated 
using the emmeans package. Happy faces were recognised faster after happy vignettes than after 
sad vignettes, t (14.25) = 5.595, p < .001, while sad faces were recognised faster after sad vignettes
than after happy vignettes, t (14.78) = 4.849, p < .001. 
In order to calculate the Bayes Factor to compare our RT Model 1 (i.e., with additive effects 
of Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion and with the interaction between them) to RT Model 2 (i.e., 
with additive effects of Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion, but with no interaction between them) 
we had to simplify the random effects structure; for both models we had random intercepts and 
slopes involving additive effects of Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion for participants and 
vignettes, and faces. This produced a Bayes Factor (BF12) of 3,269,017 in support of Model 1 over 
Model 2.
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In our GLMM analysis for the accuracy data, the fixed effects were Vignette Emotion 
(Happy, Sad), Facial Emotion (Happy, Sad), and the interaction between these factors. Our model 
contained crossed random effects of participants and vignettes. The random effect of faces was 
dropped in order to arrive at a model that converged. The model with the most maximal effects 
structure that converged included only random intercepts by participants and by vignettes. The 
model revealed a significant interaction between Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion, p = .0443 
(see Table 7 for parameter estimates). 
(Table 7 about here)
The interaction was explored with contrasts performed using the emmeans package in R 
(Lenth et al., 2017) on the log odds ratio scale. The pairwise comparisons were interpreted using a 
Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of .025. Table 4 contains the marginal means and standard errors 
calculated using the emmeans package. Neither comparison reached statistical significance, 
suggesting that the effect observed in this re-analysis is very weak. Happy faces were not responded
to with higher accuracy after happy vignettes than after sad vignettes, z = 1.453, p = .1462, and sad 
faces were not responded to with higher accuracy after sad vignettes than after happy vignettes, z = 
1.337, p = .1811.
The Bayes Factor comparing Accuracy Model 1 (i.e., with additive effects of Vignette 
Emotion and Face Emotion and with the interaction between them) to Accuracy Model 2 (i.e., with 
additive effects of Vignette Emotion and Face Emotion, but with no interaction between them) was 
calculated to be 2.23 (BF21) in support of Model 2 over Model 1.
Summary of re-analysis
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The RT and accuracy data were re-analysed after excluding vignettes that contained possible
cue words for our emotional response options in order to investigate the possible explanation that a 
subset of vignettes were driving the effects through lexical priming. The pattern of results was 
largely the same. Furthermore, the Bayes Factors for the Experiment 2 re-analysis demonstrated 
positive support for a congruency effect in RTs (Model 1) and nearly equivocal evidence for a lack 
of a congruency effect in accuracy, which was the same overall pattern as was found in the main 
analysis. Thus, the pattern of these Bayes Factors continues to support the extended language-as-
context account (which would be supported by evidence for RT Model 1 regardless of whether 
Accuracy Model 1 or 2 is supported) over the limited situational dominance account (which would 
be supported by evidence for RT Model 2 and subsequently by Accuracy Model 2). It should be 
noted in particular that the effects demonstrated by the pairwise comparisons for Experiment 2 
became even stronger (rather than weaker) following the exclusion of the relevant vignettes. Thus, 
the re-analysis does not support the explanation that the observed effects were being driven by 
lexical priming rather than congruency effects between the vignettes and the faces. This conclusion 
is consistent with evidence from the literature that lexical priming effects are secondary to discourse
level situation models and, furthermore, that lexical-level priming is influential only when the 
discourse-level model is unreliable due to incoherence or inadequate information (Camblin, 
Gordon, & Swaab, 2007; Ledoux, Camblin, Swaab, & Gordon, 2006). Indeed, in their investigation 
of whether readers utilise general knowledge of events to understand a discourse, Metusalem et al. 
(2012) re-analysed their data along similar lines to our re-analyses to explore whether lexical 
priming could provide an alternative explanation for their effects. After removing items from the 
analysis that were most likely to produce the strongest lexical priming effects, the same pattern of 
effects emerged. Metusalem et al. concluded that any influence of lexical priming was weak and 
that the discourse-level model exerted a much stronger influence. Altogether, such evidence from 
the literature alongside the evidence from our main analyses and the re-analyses presented here 
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strongly supports the predicted context congruency effects of the vignettes on facial emotion 
processing as explained by Barrett and colleagues’ extended language-as-context account.
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Table 1: Cues for “Angry” and “Fearful” (Experiment 1) and vignettes excluded from re-analysis
“Angry” vignettes
Cue Vignette Cue Vignette Cue Vignette
Anger Annoyed Birds
Cross Emotion Enraged
Face Fight Frown
Frustrated Frustration Furious
Fury Hate Hateful
Irate Irked Mad
Me Mean Mood
Pissed Pissed off Rage
Red Red faced Sad
Scream Shout Temper
Unhappy Upset Violent
Wrath Yell
“Fear” vignettes
Afraid Alone Anxiety
Anxious Child Cower
Danger Henry 
(dangerous)
Dark Mike
Lindsey
Liliana
Face
Fear Fire Fright
Frightened Frightening Ghost
Horror Mouse Nervous
Phobia Powerless Scared
Scary Small Spider
Spiders Tearful Terrified
Terror Timid Upset
Weak Worried
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Table 2: Cues for “Happy” and “Sad” (Experiment 2) and vignettes excluded from re-analysis
“Happy” vignettes
Cue Vignette Cue Vignette Cue Vignette
Birthday Ethan Bright Cheerful
Content Crappy Day*
Days* Dog Dwarf
Ecstatic Elated Excited
Face Fun Gay
Glad Glee Gleeful
Go lucky Good Danielle Grin
Happiness Joy Joyful
Joyous Love Ethan Lucky
Pleasant Pleased Sad
Satisfied Smile Smiles
Smiling Sun Sunny
Teeth Very Becky Yellow
Yes
“Sad” vignettes
Alone Bad Joanna 
(badly)
Blue
Bored Clown Cry
Crying Adam Day* Death
Depressed Depression Down
Emotion Emotional Face
Feeling Frown Gloom
Gloomy Glum Grief
Happy Lonely Mad
Melancholy Miserable Morose
Mournful Panda Rain
Sack Sorrow Tear
Tears Unhappy Upset
Weak
* There were vignettes that contained “day” but as this is a cue for both “happy” and “sad,” these vignettes 
were included in the re-analysis.
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Table 3: Parameter estimates following the linear mixed effects model reaction time re-analysis for 
Experiment 1.
      b    SE        t
Intercept 2352.69 212.54 11.070
Vignette Emotion -27.64 139.89 -0.198
Facial Emotion -99.78 168.74 -0.591
Interaction -1436.65 242.46 -5.925*
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Table 4: Marginal means and SEs for Experiments 1 and 2 re-analyses
RT mean RT SE Accuracy mean Accuracy SE
Anger Anger 1930 236 0.985 0.009
Fear Anger 2676 259 0.860 0.035
Fear Fear 2057 216 0.981 0.009
Anger Fear 2748 275 0.927 0.023
Happy Happy 1255 90 0.992 0.006
Sad Happy 1665 104 0.977 0.014
Sad Sad 1348 95 0.998 0.002
Happy Sad 1683 96 0.990 0.007
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Table 5: Parameter estimates following the generalized linear mixed effects model accuracy re-
analysis for Experiment 1.
      b    SE        z
Intercept 3.11 0.28 11.020
Vignette Emotion 0.49 0.39 1.237
Facial Emotion -0.23 0.36 -0.649
Interaction 3.74 0.72 5.159*
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Table 6: Parameter estimates following the linear mixed effects model reaction time re-analysis for 
Experiment 2.
      b    SE        t
Intercept 1487.90 85.33 17.437
Vignette Emotion -37.23 53.43 -0.697
Facial Emotion -55.07 53.77 -1.024
Interaction -746.04 91.57 -8.147*
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Table 7: Parameter estimates following the generalized linear mixed effects model accuracy re-
analysis for Experiment 2.
      b    SE        z
Intercept 4.81 0.59 8.196
Vignette Emotion -0.26 0.72 -0.363
Facial Emotion -1.13 0.64 -1.747
Interaction 2.58 1.28 2.011*
